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Conscious experiences tend to involve a variety of features – sights, sounds, scents, 
emotions. How is it that these different features, distinct though they are, can come to 
be unified in a single, coherent experience? In other words, what is the nature of the 
unity of consciousness? Phenomenal atomists, such as Timothy Bayne, David 
Chalmers, and Barry Dainton, claim that each of the features in a complex experience 
is an experience in itself. Their theories, therefore, seek to discover what it is that 
binds these experiences together. However, the atomistic approaches have some 
shortcomings in that they tend to posit a complex ontology of experience and often 
lead to tricky implications, such as the double-instantiation of qualia, when explored 
in depth. In my paper, I argue that phenomenal holism is a plausible alternative to 
phenomenal atomism because it does not run into the same difficulties. Phenomenal 
holism is the view that we only have one experience at a given point in time, even if 
this experience has a variety of features. It is the multiplicity of simultaneous qualia 
instantiations that give rise to a complex experience. This allows for a simpler 





What is the nature of the unity of consciousness? At any given point, our experiences 
have visual, auditory, and/or tactile sensations, but what is it by virtue of which they 
come to be identified as features of a single experience? How are we to make sense of 
the relationship between the multiple features that characterize our conscious 
experience? These questions lie at the heart of this thesis, which examines two key 
approaches in analytic phenomenology.  
Section One is devoted to the standard approach known as phenomenal 
atomism. This tactic claims that each of the features in a complex experience is an 
experience in itself. Atomistic theories seek to discover what it is that binds these 
experiences together. This section lays the groundwork by examining two notable 
atomistic theories, viz. Timothy Bayne and David Chalmers’ subsumptive unity 
theory, and Barry Dainton’s theory of co-consciousness. Here I examine the 
theoretical commitments of holding either view to offer a clear comparison with the 
account of phenomenal holism that I develop later in the paper. Examples of 
atomism’s theoretical commitments are: an ontology of experience that is more 
complex than it has to be, and implications such as the double-instantiation of qualia. 
In Section Two, I develop and defend an account of moderate phenomenal 
holism. Here I argue that it presents a plausible alternative to phenomenal atomism 
because it does not run into the same difficulties as the latter, and also to strong 
phenomenal holism since it is more parsimonious in its explanation. Phenomenal 
holism is the view that we only have one experience at a given point in time, even if 
this experience has a variety of features. Strong holism asserts that each experience 
only instantiates one quale, and the multiplicity is to be found in this instantiation. On 
the other hand, moderate holism makes the more modest claim that each experience 
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has a multiplicity of qualia instantiations, and this multiplicity of simultaneous qualia 
instantiations gives rise to a complex experience. Moderate holism thus allows for a 
simpler ontology than the atomistic alternative, which has up till now been considered 
the “received view”. 
Since phenomenal holism is already being explored by philosophers such as 
Michael Tye and John Searle, I devote the second part of Section Two to illustrating 
how my theoretical account of phenomenal holism complements the largely 
neurobiological accounts that Tye and Searle propound.  
Finally, the third part of Section Two anticipates challenges to moderate 
phenomenal holism, such as the question of what unifies multiple qualia 






The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make 
their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety 
of postures and situations. 
– David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, §6. 
 
Supposing I were to take a snapshot of my conscious experience at a moment in time, 
this snapshot would likely be compounded of different types of phenomenal features. 
Each snapshot of my conscious life may be a unique medley of visual, tactile, 
auditory, olfactory, and emotional phenomena, but these variegated phenomena are 
always somehow unified into a singular experience. Indeed, it seems absurd to talk 
about one subject having two completely unrelated experiences at the same point in 
time. Features of our experiences may also be singled out and subjected to closer 
examination. For example, you may take the time on a stroll to observe how rocky the 
pavement appears. This is not to say that the rocky pavement is the only thing you are 
experiencing. Rather, you shift your focus onto that particular aspect of your 
experience much like a camera lens shifts its focus from the background to the 
foreground of a scene.  
 The ability to single out certain features of our experiences for consideration 
and discussion has led some philosophers to regard synchronic experience – the 
experience had by a single subject at a point in time – as involving multiple 
experiences. Timothy Bayne and David Chalmers, for example, express their 




At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might 
simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences 
of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the 
emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts 
about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could 
experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds 
without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep 
way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of a single encompassing state of 
consciousness.1  
 
Barry Dainton also adopts a version of this view, construing simultaneous conscious 
states of mind as bearing the relation of “co-consciousness” to each other: 
 
I am, in effect, defending a version of the view that our experiences at any given moment are 
simply bundles of phenomenal items, items which are not properties of any substance, or at 
least, not of any substance which could be regarded as being experiential in nature. Bundle 
theories are faced with a problem: what is it that binds the bundled items together? In the 
phenomenal case we can now see that this is not really a problem at all. A suitable binding 
agent is available: co-consciousness, conceived as a simple experiential relation between 
phenomenal contents.2  
 
For these philosophers, each snapshot of one’s conscious life is actually a 
smorgasbord of little experiences that are somehow pieced together to form a 





1 Timothy Bayne and David Chalmers, ‘What is the unity of consciousness?’ in The unity of 
consciousness: binding, integration, and dissociation, ed. Axel Cleeremans, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 23, emphasis mine. 
2 Barry Dainton, Stream of consciousness: unity and continuity in conscious experience (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 84.  
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coherent overall experience. I call this view phenomenal atomism,3 since it portrays 
one’s conscious state of mind at a given time as a complex of suitably related “atoms” 
of experience, analogous to a chemical molecule that comprises suitably related 
physical atoms.  
 Other philosophers reject phenomenal atomism because unlike physical atoms, 
we never encounter an individual sensation on its own apart from the overall state of 
mind of which it is supposedly a part – we always have the snapshot at hand before 
focusing on a particular aspect of it. On this view, we have only one experience at a 
time, even if this experience has a plethora of phenomenal features. This is the view I 
call phenomenal holism.4 Contemporary philosophers such as John Searle and 
Michael Tye advance versions of phenomenal holism,5 and it is also widely accepted 
by traditional phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty.6  
 My goal in this paper is to develop and defend a moderate version of 
phenomenal holism. I argue that this approach avoids the pitfalls of phenomenal 
atomism and extreme forms of phenomenal holism. Unlike phenomenal atomism, 
moderate phenomenal holism does not posit novel fundamental synchronic relations 
among the different phenomenal features of our experiences (such as Bayne and 
Chalmers’ subsumption, or Dainton’s co-consciousness). Unlike extreme phenomenal 





3 Andrew Brook and Paul Raymont call this the ‘experiential parts theory’. Cf. Brook, Andrew and 
Raymont, Paul, "The Unity of Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/consciousness-
unity/>.  
4 Brooks and Raymont call this the ‘no experiential parts theory’, ibid.  
5 John Searle, “Consciousness,” in Annual review of neuroscience (2000) 23:557-578. Michael Tye, 
Consciousness and Persons (Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 2003). Searle refers to phenomenal holism as the 
‘unified field approach’, while Tye refers to it as the ‘one-experience view’.  
6 Cf. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The phenomenological mind (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 
94-95. 
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holism, moderate holism can account for the fact that experiences occurring at 
different times can resemble or differ from one another in specific respects and to 
specific degrees. Where moderate holism faces difficulties – such as with special 
cases like split-brain scenarios – it finds itself no worse off than the alternative 
theories. These factors make it a more plausible account of the unity of consciousness 
than its competitors.  
 Section One of my paper will set the stage with a discussion of phenomenal 
atomism. This section will largely focus on Bayne and Chalmers’ theory of 
subsumptive unity, but it turns out that their theory has considerable similarity to 
Dainton’s theory of synchronic unity. The point of this section is not to find fault with 
the atomistic approach, but simply to identify its theoretical commitments and 
implications so that we may later compare it with the holistic approach that I favor. In 
Section Two, I will develop and defend an account of moderate phenomenal holism. 
Comparisons with phenomenal atomism and extreme forms of phenomenal holism 
will be made, and I will argue that moderate holism gives us a more parsimonious 
theory of the unity of consciousness. In addition, I make a further distinction between 
theoretical phenomenal holism and neurobiological versions of phenomenal holism 
and discuss how the two strands of holism can complement each other. This section 
will also identify the main challenges facing moderate holism, and discuss possible 
ways of overcoming them. 
10 
I 
1.1 Atomism and subsumption 
According to atomists about experience, one’s state of mind at a given moment 
comprises a multiplicity of simultaneous experiences. This raises the question: how 
do all these experiences become unified into a single coherent experience? Some 
atomists, such as Dainton, take the unity to be a basic relation.7 Others try to account 
for the unity by positing a complex experience to which all the atomic experiences 
belong. Bayne and Chalmers are a good example of this latter group of atomists. As 
we have seen, Bayne and Chalmers begin with the assumption that at “any given time, 
a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences,”8 and their concern is how these 
experiences are unified into a single, total experience.  
 According to Bayne and Chalmers, a plurality of simultaneous experiences 
belongs to a single, synchronically unified experience if, and only if, there is an 
experience that “subsumes” them all.9 To state the theory in terms of ‘what it is like’: 
while there is something it is like to see lightning and something it is like to hear 
thunder, there is also something it is like to see lightning and hear thunder at the same 
time. This third audio-visual phenomenal state is what subsumes and thereby unifies 
the distinct experiences of seeing lightning and hearing thunder into a single, coherent 
experience.10 To differentiate between the total experience and the simpler 
experiences it subsumes, I will henceforth refer to the former as ‘Experience’ (what 
Bayne and Chalmers’ call a ‘conscious field’) and the latter will be called 





7 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, p. 84.  
8 Bayne and Chalmers, 23. 
9 Ibid., 40.  
10 See Ibid., 32. 
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‘experiences’. Stated in these terms, the subsumptive unity thesis says that to have a 
multiplicity of synchronically unified experiences just is to have an overarching 
Experience that subsumes them. In other words, for e1, e2, and e3 to be synchronically 
unified just is for them to be subsumed by a further experience, E.  
 Subsumptive unity does not imply that the experiences are somehow 
transformed in character when they have been subsumed by the total Experience. Just 
because there is something it is like to see lightning and hear thunder at the same time 
does not mean that the individual experiences of ‘seeing lightning’ and ‘hearing 
thunder’ are somehow affected when they are conjoined together by subsumption.11 
In subsumptive unity, the relationship between e1, e2…. en and the Experience that 
subsumes them is much like the relationship between the wood and lead of a pencil. 
Both parts can co-exist or exist separately, but it is only when they are put together 
that they constitute a pencil. However, neither the lead nor the wood sheath is 
transformed in a deep way when they are put together. Similarly, for the subsumptive 
unity theorist, I may see lightning (e1) but not hear thunder (e2) or vice versa, but it is 
when e1 and e2 are subsumed by a total Experience that I see lightning and hear 
thunder at the same time, even if this does not meaningfully alter the way in which I 
experience either lightning or thunder.  
 One wonders how different this picture is from framing the unity of 
consciousness in terms of subject unity – a possibility that Bayne and Chalmers reject 





11 The idea that experiences are transformed when they are conjoined together is called ‘gestalt unity’, 
and Bayne and Chalmers explicitly state that subsumptive unity is not equivalent to gestalt unity even 
though it does not rule out the possibility that two subsumed experiences may bear a gestalt relation 
with each other. Cf. p. 27: “As we have characterized subsumptive unity, two conscious states might be 
subsumptively unified whether or not their contents stand in a special gestalt relation to each other, and 
whether or not they are especially consistent or coherent with one another.”  
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early in their paper. For two or more experiences to exhibit “subject unity” is simply 
for them all to be experiences of a single conscious being or “subject.” Compare an 
analysis of synchronic unity in terms of subject unity to Bayne and Chalmers’ 
analysis in terms of subsumptive unity: 
 
Subject unity: For a multitude of experiences to be synchronically unified is 
for the subject to have all of them at the same time. 
 
Subsumptive unity: For a multitude of experiences to be synchronically 
unified is for the subject to have an Experience that subsumes them at the 
same time. 
 
When juxtaposed in this manner, it becomes clear that the subsumptive unity thesis 
results from replacing the word “have” in the subject unity thesis with the phrase 
“have an Experience that subsumes.” If the subsumptive unity thesis is to mean 
anything different to us from the subject unity thesis, we need to be told what “having 
an experience that subsumes all one’s present experiences” means, besides just 
“having all one’s present experiences.” In other words, more needs to be said about 
what happens when an Experience subsumes other experiences.  
 When we try to get a detailed understanding of the mechanism of 
subsumption, however, we find that the subsumptive unity thesis has some puzzling 
implications. Recall that the overarching Experience and the experiences it subsumes 
are token-distinct states. We can make the following claims from this central 
conceptual commitment:  
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1. What it means for a subject to ‘see lightning and hear thunder’ is for him to have 
an Experience (E) that subsumes ‘seeing lightning’ (e1) and ‘hearing thunder’ (e2) 
at the same time. [Subsumptive unity thesis] 
 
2. Since subsumption does not entail the dissolution of the experiences that are 
subsumed, a subject who has E must also be said to have e1 and e2 at the same 
time.  
 
3. What it is like for the subject to ‘see lightning and hear thunder’ (E) at the same 
time as ‘seeing lightning’ (e1) and ‘hearing thunder’ (e2) is the same as what it is 
like for him to ‘see lightning and hear thunder’ (E). In other words, there is no 
phenomenal difference between what it is like to have E and what it is like to have 
E, e1 and e2 at the same time. 
 
Claim 3 states there is no phenomenal difference between having E and having E and 
the experiences that it subsumes (e1 and e2).12 Thus the two descriptions -- “I had e1 
and e2 at the same time” and “I had E” – describe one and the same 
phenomenological state of affairs – in terms of “what it is like,” the situation is the 
same under either description.  





12 Bayne and Chalmers appear to endorse this answer to the question, when they write: “One might try 
to go further by defining subsumption wholly in terms of notion of “what it is like” as follows: A 
phenomenal state A subsumes phenomenal state B when what it is like to have A and B simultaneously 
is the same as what it is like to have A… If there is something it is like to be in a set of states (as the 
original definition of requires), then this phenomenology will correspond to a phenomenal state A of 
the subject, and it is clear that this state will subsume the states in the original set in the sense defined 
above.” (p. 41) 
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 Given that this is so, isn’t it redundant to insist that I had all three of these 
experiences? If what it is like for the subject to have E is nothing other than what it is 
like for the subject to have e1 and e2 at the same time, then it is superfluous to 
maintain that the subject has E in addition to e1 and e2.13 For, again, this would 
suggest that the two statements: “I am having E” and “I am having e1 and e2 at the 
same time” mean the same thing, or at least refer to the same phenomenal state of 
affairs; and if this is so, then there is no need to posit an extra Experience (or, two 
extra experiences) after all. 
 But the subsumptive unity account faces a deeper problem here. This takes the 
form of a dilemma that emerges when we try to think of what subsumption involves 
in terms of qualia instantiation.  
 Bayne and Chalmers are happy to talk in terms of qualia, and anyway such 
talk can hardly be avoided in discussing the conscious character of experience: 
 
When there is something it is like to have a mental state, we can say that the mental state has a 
phenomenology, or a phenomenal character. Slightly more formally, we can say that such 
mental states have phenomenal properties, or qualia, which characterize what it is like to be 
in them. We can also say that subjects have phenomenal properties, characterizing aspects of 
what it is like to be a subject at a given time. We can then say that a phenomenal state is an 





13 As previously discussed, this phenomenological superfluity might indicate that it is problematic to 
maintain that the subject still has e1 and e2 when she has E. Nevertheless, if the subsumptive unity 
theorist claims that the subject only has E (where E includes the phenomenal characters of e1 and e2), 
then there is a sense in which the subject no longer has a multiplicity of experiences at a given point in 
time; instead, she would only have one Experience. Since this indicates phenomenal holism, it is 
doubtful that the subsumptive unity theorist (as I have understood her) would want to go down that 
path. 
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instantiation of such a property. For example, the state of experiencing a certain sort of 
reddish quality is a phenomenal state.14 
 
Following the brief treatment of qualia in the above excerpt, we may say that each 
experience that is subsumed by the total Experience has a quale that corresponds to 
that experience. We may, for instance, think of the experience of holding a pencil (e1) 
and recognize that it involves the instantiation of a quale (q1) corresponding to the 
fact that there is something it is like to hold the pencil. In addition, we may think of 
the experience of opening a book (e2) and think about the quale that this experience 
has (q2), by virtue of which there is something it is like to open the book.  
 Now, if we consider having the two experiences together where e1 and e2 are 
subsumed by E (i.e. the Experience of holding a pencil while opening a book), we are 
faced with the question: How many times are q1 and q2 instantiated? Are they 
instantiated twice – once by their respective experiences and again by the subsuming 
Experience? Or are they instantiated just once, perhaps only by the (atomic) 
experiences that they correspond to?  
 Let us consider the first possibility. Regardless of whether what it is like to 
have E is the same as what it is like to have e1 and e2 simultaneously, the 
phenomenology of having e1 and e2 must, by definition, be at least part of the 
phenomenology of being in E. In other words, the qualia instantiated in the 
conjunction of e1 and e2 and must be instantiated by E as well. Since subsumption 
does not entail the dissolution of e1 and e2 but some sort of qualitative incorporation 
instead (as per the second claim in the preceding discussion), the subsumptive unity 





14 Ibid., 29, emphasis in original.  
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theorist will have to endorse some sort of double-instantiation of qualia in cases of 
complex Experience. Take the example of the Experience of holding a pencil while 
opening a book. We may say that E instantiates the ‘holding a pencil’ quale (q1) and 
the ‘opening a book’ quale (q2). Since the component experiences also obtain when 
the subsuming Experience obtains, the Experience of holding a pencil while opening a 
book must involve the subject having the qualia ‘holding a pencil’, ‘opening a book’, 
and ‘holding a pencil and opening a book’. Presumably, this means that the subject’s 
experience of, say, ‘holding a pencil’ is twice as intense as if she were to hold the 
pencil without opening the book!  
 To illustrate this puzzle, suppose e1 and e2 are represented in the following 






This means that if E instantiates the qualia corresponding to its component 




















But if the subject is said to have all three experiences at the same time, does this mean 
that what it is like for her at that point in time looks something like the following 





However, this is incongruous with actual experience. Consider the experience of 
seeing a desk, and a separate experience of seeing a laptop. On the occasion where we 
see the laptop on the desk, neither experience seems to be amplified in any way – we 
are not made more acutely aware of either the laptop or the desk when we experience 
them contemporaneously. If subsumptive unity does indeed entail double-
instantiation, then the counter-intuitive implications that result from this feature of the 
theory are rather incongruous with the phenomena it is meant to explain.  
 The subsumptive unity theorist is likely to prefer the second possibility, where 
each quale is instantiated only once. On this reading, the subsuming Experience only 
carries the phenomenal feel of a quale insofar as the an experience having that quale 
is part of it. So, for an Experience to instantiate a quale is nothing more than for it to 
subsume an experience that has that quale -- the quale does not get instantiated once 
by the subsuming Experience and once by the experience it subsumes, but only one 
time, by the subsumed experience. (We could describe the Experience as 





15 The idea here is analogous to the transparencies of an overhead projector being layered on each 
other, thereby achieving a more complex image. Where grey P’s and B’s on two transparencies overlap 





“derivatively instantiating” the quale, but that would not change the underlying 
situation we were describing.) 
 We may think of this on analogy to the greenness and tartness of a Granny 
Smith apple. These are, indeed, properties of the apple. However, greenness and 
tartness are, strictly speaking, properties of parts of the apple that make up the whole 
– that is, the skin and flesh respectively – and it is by virtue of encompassing both of 
these parts that the apple is said to possess these properties.  
 While the proposal we are considering avoids the counterintuitive implications 
of double-instantiation, it introduces a part/whole relation between the Experience and 
experiences in the mechanism of subsumption. In fact, Bayne and Chalmers recognize 
the potential similarities between the subsumptive relationship and mereological 
relationship in their article:  
 
The paradigm case of subsumption is the relation between a complex phenomenal state and a 
simpler state that is intuitively one of its “components”. One might think of subsumption as 
analogous to a sort of mereological part/whole relation among phenomenal states, although 
this should be taken as an aid to intuition rather than as a serious ontological proposal, at least 
at this point.16 
 
Although Bayne and Chalmers refer to mereology simply as “an aid to intuition”, it 
seems that they must construe subsumptive unity in mereological terms, in order to  
avoid the double-instantiation problem.17  





16 Bayne and Chalmers, p. 40. 
17 Barry Dainton discusses the distinction between ‘mereological essentialism’ and ‘hological 
essentialism’ in Chapter 8 of his book. The part/whole relation that applies to subsumptive unity at this 
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 But what does it mean to say that an Experience is token-distinct from the 
experiences it comprises, but that all of its qualities are derived from the experiences 
it subsumes? If an Experience is just a set of simpler experiences and it has all of its 
qualia by virtue of these simpler, component experiences having the qualia they do, 
then on what grounds does the subsumptive unity theorist claim that this Experience 
is token-distinct from its experiential parts? That is to say, what is the difference 
between the Experience occurring, and all of the simpler experiences occurring 
simultaneously? Given that we posit the instantiation of the same number of kind of 
qualia whether we say that the Experience occurs or that the experiences occur 
simultaneously, whatever difference there may be cannot be relevant to the 
phenomenal character – or, therefore, to the phenomenal unity – of our experience. 
 In sum, given the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the 
Experience and the experiences it subsumes, the subsumptive unity theorist has two 
options regarding the instantiation of qualia: on the one hand, he may maintain that 
the subsuming Experience possesses duplicates of the qualia that its subsumed 
experiences possess. If this is so, we run into the odd implication of double-
instantiation of qualia. On the other hand, he can maintain that the subsuming 
Experience only has qualia insofar as it ‘contains’ the relevant experiences via 
subsumption. If the subsumptive unity theorist selects this option, we are led to 





point in my paper is of the former variety. That is, “the doctrine that parts are necessary for the 
existence of the holes of which they are parts…” (Stream of Consciousness, p. 185) Cf. p. 188: “[A]re 
parts of total experiences necessary for the existence of their wholes? It seems so, for what are total 
experiences (or any experiential wholes) if not sums of parts that are themselves experiences?... [A] 
particular total experience is wholly constituted from, and nothing over and above, a particular 
collection of experiences and their experiential interrelations. These interrelations include the manner 
in which the component experiences are organized with respect to one another to form a total 
experience of a particular overall configuration, and include the relationship of mutual co-
consicousness.” 
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wonder whether there are any good reasons, after all, to posit an Experience in 
addition to the experiences it supposedly subsumes. Certainly there would seem to be 
no good phenomenological reason to do so, in which case subsumption cannot 
account for the phenomenal unity of experience. 
 
1.2. Atomism and co-consciousness 
Some challenges that the subsumptive unity thesis faces also face other versions of 
phenomenal atomism, while others are peculiar to it because of its distinctive unifying 
mechanism. Dainton’s theory of co-consciousness, for example, could well run into a 
similar issue of advocating a brand of unity that is curiously reminiscent of subject 
unity. One reading of co-consciousness also faces the challenges of ontological clutter 
and qualia instantiation as subsumptive unity, whereas another reading avoids these 
difficulties. In this sub-section, I will explore two readings of Dainton’s co-
consciousness and the implications that arise from it.  
 The first reading, which I will call ‘co-consciousnessa’ relies on Dainton’s 
explicit statement of what co-consciousness consists in. He writes in Stream of 
Consciousness: 
 
[Synchronic] co-consciousness is a basic experiential relationship, one about which there is 
nothing more to be said, at least while we confine ourselves to describing how things seem. In 
adopting this view, I am, in effect, defending a version of the view that our experiences at any 
given moment are simply bundles of phenomenal items, items which are not properties of any 
substance, or at least not of any substance which could be regarded as being experiential in 
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nature. […] Co-consciousness is not limited to binding distinct phenomenal contents, it binds 
together the contents themselves; it operates both between and within contents.18 
 
Co-consciousnessa is simply understood as a relationship that obtains between 
contemporaneous and unified experiences, and this relationship is, quite simply, the 
“experienced togetherness” that is characteristic of a complex experience.19 
Therefore, co-consciousnessa does not involve anything external to the related 
experiences (be it a further Experience or some other binding agent) in the unification 
of multiple experiences, neither does it have any phenomenal features peculiar to it.20 
This interpretation of co-consciousness is corroborated by Dainton’s subsequent 
work, The Phenomenal Self: 
 
Co-consciousness connects experiences, but it is important to note that it accomplishes this 
without featuring in experience, as a distinct experiential item with its own distinctive 
phenomenal features. When two experiences are co-conscious they are experienced together, 
but this togetherness is not the product of a third experience which comes between the two, it 
is a direct (unmediated, experientially speaking) relationship between the two experiences 
themselves. Co-consciousness has no phenomenal features of its own – it is not an experience 
in its own right – rather it is the way in which experiences are related when they are 





18 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, pp. 84-85, emphasis mine. 
19 Cf. Dainton, The Phenomenal Self (New York: Routledge 2008),  p. 48. 
20 Dainton explains, “ [It] is the way in which experiences are related when they are experienced 
together (and we all know precisely what it is like for experiences to be related in this way.). (The 
Phenomenal Self, p. 49, emphasis mine.) Cf. Stream of Consciousness, p. 218: “Co-consciousness 
connects or holds between experiences, and so in one sense is external to any one experience, but when 
experiences are co-conscious, they are not joined by anything external to either of them.” (emphasis 
mine) 
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experienced together (and we all know precisely what it is like for experiences to be related in 
this way).21 
 
One implication of interpreting co-consciousness as co-consciousnessa is that there is 
no further Experience that emerges out of the co-consciousness relationship between 
simultaneous experiences.  
 For Dainton, co-consciousnessa as a primitive notion suffices as an account of 
what binds a multiplicity of experiences without making unwarranted ontological 
commitments, and is consistent with our conscious life. It is, in his own words, the 
“binding agent”.22 This method of accounting for the unity of consciousness is 
certainly straightforward and economical. The account does not appear to introduce 
any new experiences over and above those that are phenomenally unified; the 
experiences are, in a sense, self-unifying. This simplicity potentially dissolves the 
problem of the unity of consciousness, for it is no longer a mystery – it is a brute fact. 
In this respect, co-conciousnessa presents an appealing alternative to subsumptive 
unity, even if Dainton regards the two theories as having much in common.23  
 Dainton acknowledges that co-consciousnessa and subject unity can appear to 
be similar, but he does not find this similarity particularly worrying: 
 





21 Dainton, The Phenomenal Self, p. 48-49, emphasis mine. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Dainton remarks in a footnote: “However, despite the differences – see Bayne (2001) for some 
contrasts – the co-consciousness and subsumptive approaches agree on one key issue: phenomenal 
unity is a product of experienced relationship between conscious states, it is not imposed from above or 
from without. Conscious states have a conjoint phenomenology if and only if they are experienced 
together – that is if they are mutually co-conscious.” (The Phenomenal Self, p. 49n17) 
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The fact that our states of consciousness are self-unifying… is of obvious relevance to my 
larger project of explicating the persistence conditions of selves in terms of experiential 
relationships and continuities. It may well be the case that synchronically unified experiences 
necessarily belong to the same subject, but we can state the conditions under which 
experiences are so unified without appealing to subjects: experiences are unified if, and only 
if, they are co-conscious. The fact that the co-consciousness relationship is (on the face of it) 
quite distinct from the relationship ‘belonging to the same subject’ is an additional bonus.24 
 
Whether the statement emphasized above suffices as a reason not to deem co-
consciousness and subject unity equivalent is not quite clear. Let us juxtapose the two 
with emphasis on the respective the binding agents: 
 
Subject unity: For a multitude of experiences to be synchronically unified is 
for the subject to have all of them at the same time. 
 
Co-consciousnessa: For a multitude of experiences to be synchronically 
unified is for them to be connected by a co-conscious relationship at the same 
time. 
 
The two binding agents indeed seem dissimilar when presented this way, since one 
version locates the binding agent outside of the experiences themselves while the 
binding agent in the other obtains between the contents of experience. We may, 
however, reformulate co-consciousness thus:  
 





24 Dainton, The Phenomenal Self, p. 48, emphasis mine. 
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Co-consciousnessa': For a multitude of experiences to be synchronically 
unified is for them to be had (or “experienced”) together.  
 
This substitution of “had together” for “connected by co-conscious relationship” blurs 
the differentiating boundary between co-consciousness and subject unity. One 
wonders: What does it mean for two experiences to be had together (or “experienced 
together,” as Dainton sometimes puts it) other than that the same subject has them? 
Trying to envisage two contemporaneous and unified experiences that are had by two 
separate subjects is a rather perplexing endeavor. Supposing two people shared the 
same complex Experience, complete with the same sensory, emotional, and 
psychological data – perhaps through some sort of avatar relationship – there is a 
sense in which they share the same consciousness. If so, there is a further sense in 
which these two people are actually one subject.  
 A possible reply that Dainton could give for differentiating co-consciousnessa 
from subject unity is if there were situations, hypothetical or actual, in which two or 
more experiences were subject unified – had by the same subject – but not co-
conscious – “had together.” That would allow Dainton to say that there’s a 
phenomenological difference between what is it like when e1 and e2 occur 
simultaneously in the same person, and what it is like when e1 is synchronically co-
conscious with e2. One could argue that this is the sort of situation that arises with 
split-brain patients.  
 However, as Dainton himself acknowledges, there is reason to be skeptical 
regarding claims about experiences that are putatively subject-unified, but not co-
conscious. As he points out, we have some reason to doubt the reliability of reports of 
simultaneous but non-co-conscious experiences, particularly given the cognitive 
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impairments that accompany the sort of brain damage that those who make such 
reports suffer from.25 
 Ultimately, what distinguishes co-consciousnessa from co-subjectivity 
(possession by the same conscious subject) for Dainton is that co-consciousnessa 
explains co-subjectivity, and not vice versa: 
 
Bundle theories are faced with a problem: what is it that binds the bundled items together? In 
the phenomenal case we can now see that this is not really a problem at all. A suitable binding 
agent is available: co-consciousness, conceived as a simple experiential relation between 
phenomenal contents… It is also phenomenologically justified, for there is no denying that 
phenomenal contents do occur together as co-conscious – they are experienced as occurring 
together – so there is no need to postulate an undetectable unifying agent (such as a 
featureless substrate).26  
 
But if co-consciousnessa just refers to the relationship that the experiential parts of a 
unified multiplicity of experiences bear to each other so as to be unified, it is hard to 
see how the presence of this relationship can explain the fact that the experiences 
occur together. Saying that e1 and e2 are co-conscious is to describe the experiences as 
standing in a certain relationship to one another, but to explain nothing.   
 For instance, say the relationship of co-consciousnessa is analogous to the 
relationship of ‘being neighbors’ that I share with my next-door neighbor, Julie. 
Suppose someone asks: ‘What is it by virtue of which the both of you live in the same 
apartment complex?’ Claiming that it is in virtue of being neighbors that we live in 





25 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, pp. 110-112. 
26 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, p. 84, emphasis mine. 
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the same apartment complex does not amount a very satisfying explanation. (In fact, it 
seems more accurate to say that it is in virtue of living in the same apartment complex 
that we come to share a neighborly relationship.) Similarly, we may ask: ‘What is it 
by virtue of which e1 and e2 are phenomenally unified?’ Just as in the neighbor 
analogy, it would be unsatisfying to simply claim that it is in virtue of being co-
conscious that e1 and e2 are bound together, having previous identified co-
consciousness as that relation by virtue of standing in which a number of experiences 
are phenomenally unified. 
 So, although co-consciousnessa avoids the problem double-instantiation of 
qualia, it is hard to see how positing it serves in any way to explain the phenomenal 
unity of one’s conscious mental life at a given point in time. 
 But it may be that co-consciousnessa is not the best interpretation of Dainton’s 
notion of co-consciousness. Dainton undoubtedly holds that co-consciousness is a 
relationship between experiences, but he also has a tendency to present the unity of 
co-conscious experiences as an experience in itself. This leads to a second 
interpretation of co-consciousness, which I will call ‘co-consciousnessb’.  
 Consider the following clarification in his chapter on ‘Phenomenal 
interdependence’: 
 
Let us represent a total experience E at a given time t thus: E = e1\e2\e3\...eN  
Each of e1-eN stands for a component part of E, such as the sensations, perceptual experiences, 
thoughts, feelings and so on that jointly constitute this total experience, and the backlash 
indicates that these items are simultaneous. […] In virtue of being composed of e1-eN, E has a 
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certain overall phenomenal character, and since E is an experience like any other, and given 
our stipulates concerning individuation, this overall character is essential to it.27 
 
Treating E as “an experience like any other” is rather different from taking a ‘total 
experience’ to simply refer to “a group of experiences which are all co-conscious with 
one another”,28 and this has implications for what co-consciousnessb involves. For 
starters, if E is indeed an experience in itself, then co-consciousnessb does in fact 
wind up introducing a further Experience in addition to the experiences that are bound 
together. The exact nature of the relationship between an Experience and its 
component experiences, then, would be something more than just “experienced 
togetherness”. In fact, it looks a lot like subsumptive unity. That being so, co-
consciousnessb runs into the same challenges as subsumptive unity does. 
 





27 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, pp. 186-187, emphasis mine. 
28 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, p. 95. 
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II 
2.1. One experience 
We have thus far been thinking of the complexity of experiences in terms of the 
phenomenal feels associated with different objects. For instance, when considering an 
Experience such as ‘holding a wooden pencil while reading a book’, we have taken 
‘holding a wooden pencil’ as one experience and ‘reading a book’ as another. 
However, the complexity involved in such everyday Experiences is more profound 
than that. Even a seemingly simple experience of ‘holding a wooden pencil’ involves 
a multiplicity of phenomenal properties: the weight of the pencil, its texture, the 
reflection of light on its case (which may well be different from the way light plays 
off the nib), its colors, the smell of the wood, etc. What the phenomenal holist and the 
atomist disagree about is how to interpret these phenomenal properties. In particular, 
they disagree over whether these phenomenal properties should be taken as 
experiences in themselves. Tye, who refers to phenomenal atomism as the “received 
view”, provides a succinct description of phenomenal holism: 
 
On this view, there really are no such entities as purely visual experiences or purely auditory 
experiences or purely olfactory experiences in normal, everyday consciousness. Where there 
is phenomenological unity across sense modalities, sense-specific experiences do not exist. 
They are the figments of philosophers’ and psychologists’ imaginations. And there is no 
problem, thus, of unifying these experiences. There are no experiences to be unified. Likewise 
within each sense: there are not many simultaneous visual experiences, for example, 
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combined together to form a complex visual experience. There is a single multimodal 
experience, describable in more or less rich ways.29 
 
The phenomenal holist may interpret this manner of looking at complex experiences – 
as singular, multi-faceted phenomenal states – in one of two ways.30 The first 
approach, which I term ‘moderate phenomenal holism’, claims that we only have one 
experience at a given point in time, and that this experience may have a multiplicity 
of phenomenal properties (qualia). On the other hand, a holist may choose to bring the 
experiential unitarianism of holism to its extreme, claiming that an experience at a 
given point in time has only one quale. I refer to this view as ‘strong phenomenal 
holism’. 
 As an alternative to atomism, I propose that moderate phenomenal holism is a 
more plausible option than strong phenomenal holism because it is able to account for 
how we can speak of one experience (say, e1) sharing more in common with another 
(e2) than a third (e3), whereas strong holism finds itself in a quandary when faced with 
such experiential resemblance. This difficulty, which is unique to strong phenomenal 
holism, stems from the way this approach explains the complexity of experience. 
Consider the experience of seeing blue curtains, the auditory and tactile sensations 
associated with a keyboard under your fingertips, and the awareness of a cup of tea to 
your right. According to the strong holist, this whole multi-modal experience 





29 Tye, Consciousness and Persons, p. 28, emphasis mine. To clarify, what I am calling ‘phenomenal 
holism’ is what Tye refers to as the ‘one-experience’ view. My view should also be distinguished from 
what Barry Dainton calls ‘phenomenal holism’ in Stream of Consciousness and an article titled 
‘Phenomenal Holism’ (in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 2010, pp. 113-139), which is 
actually phenomenal interdependence. 
30 I will henceforth drop the use of ‘Experience’ to differentiate between the experiential whole and its 
parts, since the holist claims that there is only one experience at each given point in time.  
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instantiates just a single quale. So, instead of saying that the experience has the 
qualitative character of ‘blue’ and the qualitative sensation of ‘whirring’, the strong 
holist says the experience has a qualitative character of ‘blue and whirring’.  
 By insisting on such singularity of phenomenal properties, the strong holist is 
faced with the issue of how we can recognize certain sensations or experiences of 
objects to be the same as certain others we have encountered in the past, in various 
respects. When I see the blue curtains at my window, I recognize them as being the 
same curtains as the ones I had yesterday. When you accidentally touch a hot kettle, 
you are able to identify the pain as being similar to a childhood experience of 
touching a hot kettle. In addition, you would also be able to differentiate it from the 
painfulness of a pinprick. This sort of recognition enables us to identify certain 
experiences as being more similar than others. Say you are given three experiences: 
 
e1: You are sitting the E.R. and you can hear the screeching sirens of the 
ambulances.  
 
e2: You are doing a sound-test for a rock concert and audio feedback during a 
sound check results in a high-pitched squeal from the speakers. 
 
e3: You are listening to the steady rhythm of a clock ticking.  
 
Of the three, we would agree that e1 and e2 are more similar to one another than either 
is to e3. Yet if, as strong holism purports, we only have one quale at each point in 
time, then on what grounds are we able make this claim? In other words, where 
complex experiences like our everyday conscious lives are concerned, how are we 
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able to speak of our experiences sharing some features in common with others if all 
we have, strictly speaking, is a variety of singular, irreducible and distinct 
experiences? The onus is on the strong holist to address this challenge in her account.  
Moderate phenomenal holism is not faced with this issue because it accepts 
that an experience may comprise a multiplicity of qualia at a point in time. So, a 
moderate holist has a solution when asked to account for the similarity and difference 
between the following two experiences: 
 
e1 at t1: You are sitting on the bed in a dark room and listening to the clock 
ticking. 
 
e2 at t2: You decide to lie down on the bed in the dark room, and you can still 
hear the clock ticking. 
 
The moderate holist does this by identifying four different types of qualia that are 
characteristic of the two experiences.31 These are: 
 
q1: Sitting 
q2: Dark  
q3: Listening to clock ticking 
q4: Lying on the bed 
 





31 Or, perhaps five qualia in total if one wants to count what it is like to make a decision as one quale. 
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The moderate holist can account for why e1 and e2 can be said to resemble each other 
by pointing out that they both have the qualia q2 and q3. She can also explain their 
difference with reference to the fact that q4 was absent from e1, while q1 was absent 
from e2. 
 
2.2.1. Many in one 
We have seen that moderate phenomenal holism fares better than strong phenomenal 
holism where experiential resemblance is concerned, because the former allows for a 
single experience to have a multiplicity of qualia. In allowing for a multiplicity of 
qualia, however, one may wonder if moderate holism actually is an atomistic account 
masquerading as form of phenomenal holism.  
 Simply put, no. Moderate holism’s insistence that we only have one 
experience at a given point in time is a straightforward rejection of this possibility. 
There are admittedly parallels between moderate holism and its atomistic competitors, 
and one might come to think that moderate holism and, say, subsumptive unity are 
really endorsing the same phenomenological picture albeit one that substitutes 
‘qualia’ for ‘experiences’. The significance of this difference must not be overlooked, 
however, because insisting on a multiplicity of qualia instead of a multiplicity of 
experience allows moderate holism to avoid some of the main difficulties afflicting 
atomism.  
 To make the contrast more explicit, recall the central idea of subsumptive 
unity: what it means to have a complex experience is to have many experiences at the 
same time, where one of these experiences subsumes the rest. It is by virtue of the 
instantiation of qualia in these component experiences that the subsuming experience 
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is said to involve a multiplicity of qualia. If we were to illustrate subsumptive unity, a 







Indeed, this illustration can be generalized to depict other atomistic theories, such as 
Dainton’s co-consciousness; here, we may simply take subsumption to mean that the 
experience ‘includes’ the component experiences. On the other hand, moderate 
holism states that what it means to have a complex experience at a given time is for 







Evidently, the difference between atomism and moderate holism is more than the 
simple substitution of one term for another. It begins with a difference in the method 
of studying conscious experience. Moderate holism begins first with the whole 





32 As I have pointed out in §1.2.3. of this paper, one of the shortcomings of subsumptive unity is the 
vagueness surrounding what subsumption actually involves.  
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experience, and then proceeds to observe that it has many properties. It treats 
experience as if it were a colorful painting of a bucolic scene, which has a multiplicity 
of colors, shapes, and shades. Indeed, we may isolate a certain portion of the painting 
– the illustration of a church, for example – and observe its shading, colors, mood, 
etc. However, this does not mean that the illustration of the church, when considered 
in context of the whole painting, is a painting in itself. Analogously, just because I 
hear thunder and see lightning in my experience of a thunderstorm, this does not 
necessarily mean that ‘hearing thunder’ and ‘seeing lightning’ are individual 
experiences that are somehow conjoined together. This difference in approach results 
in an ontologically simple theory of consciousness that has several advantages over 
phenomenal atomism.  
 
2.2.2. De-cluttering the phenomenological picture 
Moderate phenomenal holism’s ‘one-level’ picture of experience means that it does 
not need to explain what binds together or unifies a plurality of experiences. The 
moderate holist need not engineer an elaborate metaphysical account because it 
begins with the basic character of experience that introspection reveals, i.e. that we 
have one coherent experience that tends to be variegated. This difference has several 
advantages over the atomistic view. First, while the atomist is compelled to explain 
whether Experiences are just the sums of their experiential parts or more than mere 
experiential aggregates, the moderate holist is invulnerable to such a problem because 
he maintains that an experience does not have other experiences as parts. In short, the 
unity of consciousness does not arise as a problem for the moderate holist.  
 Second, since moderate holism asserts that qualia, when instantiated by the 
same thing at the same time, constitute a single experience, it is invulnerable to the 
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problem of double-instantiation of qualia that subsumptive unity (and, on one 
interpretation, Dainton’s co-consciousness) has to deal with. In addition, the 
instantiation of qualia by a single experience also means that an experience’s 
properties are, fundamentally, its own. This consequence of moderate holism means 
that it avoids the difficulties that face subsumptive unity discussed in §1.2 of this 
paper, viz. those pertaining to where an Experience derives its salient properties from. 
 A third advantage of moderate holism is revealed when we consider how 
exactly an atomist means to identify parts of an Experience as experiences in 
themselves. Imagine that you see a red ball bouncing along the sidewalk and hear 
children laughing while walking down a street. Given the many features that we are 
presented with in this Experience, how do we identify which features of this 
Experience qualify as experiences? The atomist has two options. She could claim that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between qualia and experiences, so we single 
out experiences by singling out qualia. This means that ‘red’, ‘ball’, and ‘bouncing’, 
‘children’, and ‘laughing’ qualify as individual experiences. So, 
 
‘red’  = q1  = e1 
‘ball’   = q2  = e2 
‘bouncing’  = q3 = e3 
‘children’ = q4 = e4 
‘laughing’ = q5 = e5 
 
However, we do intuitively want to say that within this Experience, e1, e2, and e3 bear 
a special relationship to each other, while e4 and e5 are more closely related to each 
other than to the other three experiences. Does this mean that there are multiple levels 
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of subsumption, say, that occur in order to first establish object unity before 
phenomenal unity? Or, to put it in terms of co-consciousness, does this mean that 
there is a further binding agent apart from co-consciousness that binds e1, e2, and e3 
but not e4 and e5 even though all five of these experiences are said to share the 
relationship of co-consciousness? These are questions an atomist must face.  
 To avoid these questions, an atomist might want to say that ‘red ball 
bouncing’ qualifies as a single experience with multiple qualia, while ‘children 
laughing’ qualifies as another. Indeed, this may be a more intuitive way to 
characterize experiences, but the atomist is nonetheless hard-pressed to account for 
how she comes to identify the basic experiences (or, count the experiences) that make 
up an Experience. The moderate holist’s view avoids such complications altogether.  
 
2.2.3. Expanding the horizon of phenomenal holism 
Thus far, my presentation and discussion of phenomenal holism has laid the 
groundwork for a response to what I shall now refer to as ‘theoretical atomism’ – that 
is, atomism that focuses largely on the theoretical framework of unity – for the 
atomists that I have responded to have tended to focus on arguing for abstract binding 
mechanisms that result in a unified conscious state. There are, however, atomists that 
operate with a more empirical framework, viz. the neural correlates of consciousness, 
and are concerned with the relationship between the unity of consciousness and 
cortical activities in the brain. I call them the ‘neurobiological atomists’. Phenomenal 
holism is hardly the standard view in either the theoretical or neurobiological arenas, 
but there is a small group of philosophers responding to neurobiological atomism. Tye 
and Searle are two examples. Given the nature of my project, the way in which I have 
arrived at and presented phenomenal holism is markedly different from Tye and 
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Searle’s approach, since they are concerned with the neural correlates of 
consciousness and do not directly discuss qualia instantiation. Nevertheless, Tye does 
refer briefly to the representation of phenomenal content in experience, which can be 
regarded as, at least, closely related to qualia instantiation.  
 Of the two, Tye’s view bears more resemblance to my presentation of 
moderate holism. Although it is not at once clear whether his ‘one-experience view’ 
qualifies as strong holism or moderate holism as I have defined above, the following 
statement at the end of his chapter on synchronic unity is telling: 
 
Experiences are maximal PANIC states (states having a poised, abstract, nonconceptual 
content). So, even if some proper parts of experiences are representations, they are not 
themselves experiences.33 
 
Evidently, Tye draws a distinction between representations (or, qualia) and 
experiences, and this underpins both our accounts. This lies at the heart of his 
rejection of atomism. He argues that it does not follow from the fact that the activity 
in a subject’s visual cortex is responsible for a certain visual phenomenology that this 
phenomenology is itself an experience, even if activity in all other cortices is 
inhibited. He uses the example of a wine taster whose visual phenomenology is the 
result of activity in his visual cortex. Say different cortices in the wine taster’s brain 
are typically responsible for the smells and tastes associated with wine tasting, and 
these cortices fail to produce the relevant phenomenologies in a hypothetical 
situation. The wine taster’s experience in this instance would certainly have a purely 





33 Tye, p. 40. 
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visual phenomenology, but this does not mean that the activity in the visual cortex has 
produced this experience. It is far more accurate to say that said cortical activity has 
resulted in the phenomenology that is characteristic of that experience. In this manner, 
it is inaccurate to say that activity in various cortices in the brain produce a 
multiplicity of experiences, although it is acceptable to say that they produce the 
phenomenologies of experiences. 
 Although Tye is largely focused on what we can reasonably claim about the 
relationship between consciousness and the empirical data we have about brain 
function, his account would also benefit if it were understood in terms of qualia. The 
argument against atomism, for example, could simply be paraphrased to state that it 
does not follow from the fact that activity in the visual cortex instantiates visual-type 
qualia, that such activity is somehow responsible for the production of the experience 
when activity in other cortices are suspended. Further, qualia-talk can elucidate the 
distinction between referring to the ‘phenomenology of an experience’ and speaking 
of an ‘experience with a certain phenomenology’. Of this, Tye writes: 
 
Seeing something entails the presence of a visual experience. I cannot see X unless X looks 
some way to me; and for X to look some way to me, it must cause in me a visual experience. 
So, to return to the example of the wine taster, since he is seeing the wine in the glass, he must 
be subject to a visual experience. However on the account I am adopting, his experience isn’t 
really properly classified as visual at all. It is indeed true that X cannot look some way to 
person P unless X produces in P an experience with visual phenomenology. But the 
phenomenology of P’s experience need not be purely or exclusively visual. It can be partly 
auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual too. If a visual experience is understood to be an 
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experience with visual phenomenology, then the wine taster, as he sees the wine in the glass, 
is subject to a visual experience. It’s just that that very experience has a phenomenology that 
is auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual, as well.34  
 
Framing this argument in terms of qualia is certainly helpful and more straightforward 
because one may then conveniently distinguish the ‘phenomenology of an experience’ 
from an ‘experience that involves the instantiation of a particular quale’.  
 Unlike Tye, Searle’s attack on neurobiological atomism is focused largely on 
some oversights in its methodology that result in contentious predictions. A self-
professed former atomist, Searle proposes a holistic view (what he terms the “unified 
field theory”) that regards variations, complexities, and changes in the 
phenomenology of an experience as “modification[s] of the conscious field, as a new 
form that the unified field takes.”35 There are thus, strictly speaking, no experiential 
parts to speak of. He explains: 
 
We should not think of my new experiences as new actors on the stage of consciousness but 
as new bumps or forms or features in the unified field of consciousness. What is the 
difference? The proscenium metaphor gives us a constant background stage with various 
actors on it. I think that is wrong. There is just the unified conscious field, nothing else, and it 
takes different forms. If this is the right way to look at things (and again this is a hypothesis on 
my part, nothing more), then we get a different sort of research project. There is no such thing 
as a separate visual consciousness, so looking for the [neural correlate of consciousness] is 
barking up the wrong tree. Only the already conscious subject can have visual experiences, so 





34 Tye, p. 35, emphasis mine.  
35 Searle, p. 573. 
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the introduction of visual experiences is not an introduction of consciousness but a 
modification of preexisting consciousness.36 
 
In a nutshell, consciousness is like a lump of clay that can be molded and shaped into 
an array of images, and changes in the way it is presented to us are due to alterations 
in the clay’s physical form. Granted, Searle’s approach to holism is noticeably 
different from Tye’s version as well as the moderate holism I have presented in this 
paper. It is nevertheless compatible with the latter versions, at least at this nascent 
stage of development in phenomenal holism, because the instantiation of different 
qualia may reasonably be regarded as the kind of experiential modification of the 
conscious field that Searle has in mind.  
 Despite the differences between moderate holism and the two alternative 
versions of holism presented in this section, the similarities and theoretical 
compatibility between the three accounts indicate that holism is hardly a cacophonous 
collection of discordant philosophical voices. These various theories present a fuller 
picture of holism when considered together. This is a picture that has considered the 
difficulties of maintaining atomism, either in its theoretical or neurobiological form, 
and in turn responds with an alternative that strives to be more consistent with 
conscious experience as we encounter it. Indeed, theoretical holism stands to gain 
with insight from its empirically-based neurobiological peers, and neurobiological 
holism can at times be made clearer by framing its arguments in theoretical holism’s 
vocabulary.  
 





36 Searle, p. 574, emphasis mine. 
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2.3. Anticipated Challenges – developing moderate holism 
2.3.1. Subject unity and the unity of qualia 
Like any philosophical position, moderate holism faces various challenges. Notably, 
one of the common challenges facing the versions of phenomenal atomism discussed 
in §1 is that the theories have not adequately differentiated themselves from subject 
unity, although such differentiation is one of their goals. Recall, atomists are wary of 
analyzing phenomenal unity in terms of subject unity, because doing so seems to 
trivialize the concept of phenomenal unity:  
 
Subject unity': What it means to have a complex synchronic Experience is 
for the subject to have a multitude of experiences at the same time.  
 
Atomists argue that this statement is true by definition and therefore fails as an 
explanation of the unity of consciousness. Similarly, it is arguable that moderate 
phenomenal holism also runs the risk of devolving into an attempt to analyze 
phenomenal unity in terms of subject unity. It is just that subject unity is now 
expressed in terms of qualia: for me to have a phenomenally complex experience at a 
given time is just for me (the conscious subject) to instantiate multiple qualia at the 
same time. Such a line of criticism basically accuses the moderate holist of trading a 
problem about experiences for a problem about qualia instantiations.  
 Starkly put, the question is: What unifies the qualia? After all, even though the 
holist posits a single experience, there still is a multiplicity involved in this 
singularity. One may, reasonably, ask what it is by virtue of which these qualia bind 
together to form a single experience. For instance, say you and I have distinct 
experiences at the same point in time – you are having the experience of holding a 
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ripe tomato, while I am having the experience of touching sandpaper. This means that 




q3: scent of tomato 
q4: grittiness  
q5: brownness  
 
This leads one to ask: what is it that unifies q1, q2, and q3 such that their simultaneous 
instantiation forms your experience of holding a ripe tomato, while the simultaneous 
instantiations of q4 and q5 form my experience?  
 For an idea of a possible answer, we may first turn to Tye’s account of what it 
means for the features of an experience to be unified: 
 
 Specifically, phenomenal unity is a matter of simultaneously experienced perceptual qualities 
entering into the same phenomenal content. The perceptual experience a normal perceiver 
undergoes has an enormously rich, multi-modal representational content – a content part of 
which is nonconceptual, abstract, and appropriately poised…it is this phenomenal content that 
endows the experience with its phenomenal character. […] Where [multiple perceptual 
experiences occur simultaneously], for example, with split-brain patients, there are 
simultaneously experienced perceptual qualities entering into different phenomenal contents.37  
 





37 Tye, p. 36-37, emphasis mine. 
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Similar to Tye’s notion of the ‘same phenomenal content’, the theoretical moderate 
holist may propose the concept of a single, mental processor of information that is the 
instantiator of qualia. This instantiator could be a certain complex neural state that a 
phenomenal subject has, that instantiates qualia when presented with certain stimuli. 
This stands in contrast to Chalmers’ account of a neural correlate of consciousness: 
 
A neural correlate of the contents of consciousness is a neural representational system N such 
that representation of a content in N directly correlates with representation of that content in 
consciousness.38 
 
However, there is a difference between Chalmers’ atomistic account of a neural 
correlate of consciousness and the moderate holistic picture I am proposing. 
Chalmers’ account treats each type of representation, or, phenomenal property as 
having a corresponding neural correlate, which means that a multiplicity of qualia 
corresponds to a multiplicity of neural correlates. He writes: 
 
A state N1 of system N is a neural correlate of phenomenal property P if N's being in N1 
directly correlates with the subject having P.  
 
Note that we here talk of a state being an NCC. Given a specific phenomenal property - 
experiencing a horizontal line, for example, it is no longer clear that it makes sense to speak 
of a given system being the NCC of that property. Rather, it will be a particular state of that 
system. Neural firing in certain horizontal cells in IT (say) might be a neural correlate of 
seeing a horizontal line, for example; and having one's neurochemical system in a certain 





38 David Chalmers (2000) ‘What is a neural correlate of consciousness?’, §2. Accessed at: 
http://consc.net/papers/ncc2.html 
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region of state space might be a neural correlate of waking consciousness, on Hobson's 
hypothesis. These are specific states of the neural systems in question.39  
 
In other words, a visual representation of an apple would have a different neural 
correlate from the audio representation of the clash of cymbals, and each of these 
neural correlates somehow bind together to piece these distinct properties together. 
Further, Chalmers introduces the concept of “phenomenal families”, which I interpret 
to mean types of phenomenal properties. Each phenomenal family comprises all the 
properties that fall under the type; thus, the visual qualia of ‘a desk lamp’, ‘a mug’, 
and ‘a sheet of paper’ fall under the phenomenal family of visual consciousness: 
 
Most of the time, we are not concerned with neural correlates of single phenomenal 
properties, but of families of phenomenal properties. […] Work on the visual NCC is not 
concerned with just the neural correlate of horizontal experience, but with the neural 
correlates of the whole system of visual experiential contents. We might say a phenomenal 
family is a set of mutually exclusive phenomenal properties that jointly partition the space of 
conscious experiences, or at least some subset of that space. That is, any subject having an 
experience (of a certain relevant kind) will have a phenomenal property in the family, and will 
not have more than one such property. Specific contents of visual consciousness make for a 
phenomenal family, for example: any visually conscious subject will have some specific 
visual content, and they will not have two contents at once (given that we are talking about 
overall visual content). The same goes for contents at a particular location in the visual field: 
anyone with an experience as of a certain location will have some specific content associated 
with that location (a red horizontal line, say), and not more than one […] The same again goes 
for color experience at any given location: there will be a phenomenal family (one property 





39 Chalmers, 2000, §2, emphasis mine.  
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for each color quality) for any such location. And the same goes for background states of 
consciousness. All these sets of phenomenal properties make phenomenal families. 
 
We can then say: A neural correlate of a phenomenal family S is a neural system N such that 
the state of N directly correlates with the subject's phenomenal property in S.40 
 
And each of these phenomenal families has one neural correlate of consciousness:  
 
For any phenomenal family S, a subject will have at most one property in S (one background 
state, or one overall state of visual consciousness, or one color quality at a location). Neural 
system N will be [a neural correlate of consciousness] of S when there are a corresponding 
number of states of N, one for every property in P, such that N's being in a given state directly 
correlates with the subject's having the corresponding phenomenal property. […] For the 
neural correlate of contents of consciousness, one will have a much more complex 
phenomenal family (overall states of visual consciousness, or states of color consciousness at 
a location, or particular conscious occurrent thoughts), and a neural representational system to 
match. The state of the NCC will directly correlate with the specific phenomenal property.41  
 
So, when several phenomenal families obtain simultaneously – e.g. the families of 
states of visual consciousness and of background state of consciousness – we may say 
that the corresponding number of neural correlates also obtain.  
 This is not the case for the moderate holist. The holist’s notion of a single 
instantiator of qualia means that there is only one processor, or system, that gives rise 
to the complex experience that a subject has. This central processor of stimuli 
receives signals from the relevant faculties that have been stimulated – say, from the 





40 Chalmers, ibid.  
41 Chalmers, ibid. 
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optic nerve – and instantiates all the relevant qualia at the same time. It is by virtue of 
being instantiated by this single processor – a common medium – that qualia are 
instantiated simultaneously and give rise to a single experience. This central 
instantiator of qualia is thus analogous to the central processing unit of a computer 
that executes commands based on the input it receives from the software (and 
hardware) of a computer. Typing on my keyboard in this word processing software 
sends signals to the central processing unit of my computer, which, in turn, manifests 
the signals it has received as as the series of alphabets that form this paragraph on my 
computer screen. Similarly, various stimuli from different faculties send signals to the 
central instantiator of qualia simultaneously, causing it to realize all the relevant 
qualia at the same time.  
 What the central instantiator of qualia is, in the neural context, is still up for 
speculation and it remains an open question whether or not it is a neural network or 
system of some other sort. In any event, the moderate holist’s picture would imply 
that there is only one neural correlate of consciousness at each point in time, and it is 
this correlate that gives rise to a varied, but unified experience. 
 
2.3.2. The possibility of phenomenal disunity 
Another challenge that may be raised to moderate phenomenal holism is the 
possibility of phenomenal disunity, such as that which supposedly occurs in split-
brain patients. Findings in neuropsychological research have perplexed 
phenomenologists because such patients, in whom the left and right hemispheres of 
their brain do not communicate due to the severance of the corpus callosum, have 
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reported divergent experiences that do not appear to be connected when their left and 
right visual fields are presented with different stimuli.42 Chapter 5 of Tye’s 
Consciousness and Persons is devoted to the discussion of the possibility of 
phenomenal disunity, and he cites facts about split-brain patients to bolster his 
argument that severed corpus callosums do not necessarily present the dire picture 
that phenomenologists are worried about. He argues that for the most part, split-brain 
patients “are single persons whose consciousness is unified except in certain very 
special experimental situations.”43 Though they appear to have two streams of 
consciousness under such situations, their conscious experiences rejoin into a single, 
coherent stream once they exit such situations.  
 In the context of theoretical holism, what experiences are like for a split-brain 
patient is admittedly a tricky question. If the brain processes stimuli in a less coherent 
fashion, how does this affect qualia instantiation and the complexity of experience? 
At this juncture, let us consider the following example that Tye discusses: 
 
In another experiment, the subject saw, with his right hemisphere only, a picture of a 
frightening scene of a fire. Afterward, he commented, “I don’t really know what I saw; I think 
just a white flash. Maybe some trees, red trees like in the fall. I don’t know why, but I feel 
kind of scared. I feel jumpy. I don’t like this room, or maybe it’s you guys getting nervous.” 





42 Bayne and Chalmers, p. 38. To give an idea of what such experiments have found, they write: “Such 
a patient behaves in a surprisingly normal fashion much of the time, but in certain circumstances they 
behave quite unusually. For example when presented with different pictures in different halves of their 
visual field (e.g. a cat on the left and a dog on the right), and asked to report the contents, the patient 
will report seeing only a dog, since the left hemisphere, which dominates speech, receives input from 
the right visual field. When asked to write down what they see with their left hand (which is controlled 
by the right hemisphere), such a patient may slowly write “CAT”; with the right hand, the patient may 
write “DOG”. If a patient writes with her left hand in her right visual field, a conflict may occur when 
the patient sees what is written, and in some cases the right hand scratches out what the left hand has 
written.” (ibid.) 
43 Tye, p. 128.  
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Again, what seems to have happened is that the emotion triggered by the right hemisphere had 
an effect via the brainstem, on the verbal left hemisphere.44 
 
Based on the findings of the above experiment, the theoretical holist may say that 
despite the alterations in brain physiology, we may say that there still is a single 
experience. Granted, what it is like to perceive that visual stimulus under split-brain 
conditions differs greatly from normal conditions. Nevertheless, what this tells us is 
that the way in which the qualia are instantiated is greatly affected by the way the 
brain functions. But this does not necessarily mean that one’s experiences 
automatically become disunified.  
 Admittedly, there are still questions pertaining to split-brain patients that 
theoretical holism has to account for. Take, for example, Tye’s discussion of the 
administration of various stimuli that suggest the nontransitivity of phenomenal 
experience. He points out that there is still, strictly speaking, communication between 
the left and right hemispheres of the brain even if the corpus callosum is severed.45 
When prickly stimuli are administered to the neck and head, which stimulates the 
subcortical pathways of the brainstem, at the same time as red stimuli in the left visual 
field and green stimuli in the right visual field, the subject reports experiencing the 
pricks simultaneously. However, the same cannot be said of the visual stimuli, which 
are not experienced together. In addition, the pricking is reported as being 
experienced simultaneously with the redness, just as it is reported as being 





44 Tye, p. 129. 
45 Tye, p. 129-130. 
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experienced simultaneously with the greenness. Experience would thus look 







According to Tye, this means that phenomenal unity can be nontransitive. For the 
theoretical holist, this is certainly an interesting problem. Without a report on what 
such nontransitivity means for what it is like for the subject, on the whole, at that 
point in time, it is admittedly difficult for the theoretical holist to say much on the 
matter. This certainly is an area of phenomenal holism that needs more attention as 
the theory develops alongside neuropsychological research. 
Pricking on left side 
of neck 
Pricking on right 
side of neck 
Seeing red in left 
visual field 
Seeing green in 
right visual field 
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Conclusion 
Theoretical phenomenal holism is still a relatively young theory and it is bound to 
encounter teething problems along the way. In the course of this paper, however, I 
have sought to demonstrate that it is a plausible alternative to the “received view” – 
phenomenal atomism – despite these problems. We have seen how the complex 
theoretical mechanisms of phenomenal atomism have resulted in some perplexing 
difficulties, which are rooted either in ambiguity in the terms that have been used, or 
oversights in the description of the mechanisms that bind experiences. In contrast, 
moderate holism is a straightforward and less ontologically complex view that makes 
claims about experience purely on the basis of how we encounter it. This difference in 
methodology is, I submit, key to avoiding unrealistic consequences such as the 
double-instantiation of qualia.  
 The basis of theoretical holism differs from its empirical counterpart, what I 
have called neurobiological holism, but I have argued that these two positions 
nevertheless have the same project in mind. This difference in approach means that 
the developments in either strand of holism stand to benefit from insights from its 
counterpart. We have seen how neurobiological holism can be made clearer by 
casting some of its arguments in terms of qualia. We have also seen how theoretical 
holismcan draw on neurobiological holism to identify the entities that simultaneously 
instantiate qualia so as to yield complex unified conscious experiences. Indeed, there 
is much more to be clarified and said about holism in general. At this juncture, non-
transitivity of phenomenal unity appears to be one of the pressing questions that 
theoretical holism has to address; as is the question of whether it is possible for one 
subject to have more than one experience – a consequence of Tye’s claim that 
experience can divide and join like a stream that divides and merges along the way. 
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Regardless of these questions, that will surely be discussed in time to come, it is my 
hope that a strong case has been made for the plausibility of moderate holism as an 
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